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This paper advocates the idea that the European Union’s “two way process” approach to migration and 
integration should boldly be replaced by the notion of a “three way” approach for the better 
incorporation of immigrants in the EU.  
The first part of the paper outlines the emergence of a “common” immigration and integration 
policy at the EU level, its main features and in particular the role of the European Commission in 
shaping this policy. The second part critically examines the place that is attributed to sending countries 
in efforts to draw up a “common” immigration and integration policy. Particular emphasis is laid on 
the ways the EU defines and frames the place and function of “sending countries” in its immigration 
policy. In the last section, the role that sending countries could play in the context of a “three way” 
approach to integration is explored against the background of the Turkish experience. In this section, 
the author makes various concrete suggestions in support of a “three way” approach whose aim is to 
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Introduction1 
In the course of the last couple of years the incorporation of immigrants especially from Muslim 
countries has come to dominate the agendas of a number of European Union (EU) member countries 
as well as the institutions of the EU. An estimated 15 million Muslims lived in various countries of the 
EU before the 2004 enlargement.2 While some have become citizens of the respective countries in 
which they reside, many continue to hold the status of Third Country Nationals (TCNs). Although 
there are large numbers of Muslims, current or former immigrants, who have integrated and in some 
cases even assimilated into their host societies, there are also those who remain outside mainstream 
life. Poor labour market integration accompanied with low levels of education is often associated with 
these migrants as well as their descendants. Certain practices ranging from such as domestic violence 
against women, forced marriages, religious radicalism to the denial of schooling to young girls are 
seen by host societies as cultural characteristics attributed to the failure of these immigrants to 
integrate into host societies. The emergence and concentration of Muslim immigrant communities in 
major European cities have also rendered the integration “problem” visible. The “problem” is 
increasingly associated to a ‘security’ dimension. Some major terrorist attacks as well as crimes such 
as the assassination of the Dutch filmmaker Van Gogh are linked to the “Muslimness” of the 
perpetrators. Hence the presence of Muslim immigrants is seen by some in the West through the 
prisms of security concerns. Yet, at the same time there is also a recognition that the rise of anti-
immigration or anti-immigrant feelings accompanied with Islamophobia in many host societies risks 
threatening the very liberal values that constitutes the basis of the European Union. A European 
Parliament Resolution in 2006 addressing the issue of the immigrants’ integration in the EU openly 
raises the danger of “fear among citizens subverting respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities.”3 
This situation is leading to growing cooperation between most affected member states and the EU 
institutions. Immigration issues until the Maastricht Treaty (1992) remained strictly under the realm of 
national sovereignty. However, in the course of the last decade many immigration related issues such 
as asylum, combating illegal migration, management of visa policies have been moved to the 
community level.4 Since 2004, the European Commission has acquired the right to prepare legislation 
and take initiative while decision making on these issues can be reached on a qualified majority basis. 
Yet, the issue of regular immigration and integration policies is still addressed through unanimity 
decision making with a very restricted role granted to the European Commission. The European 
Commission had to go through an almost two-decade long political struggle to be able to draw the 
attention of member states to the issue of the immigrants’ integration let alone to develop common 
policies at the EU level. The Commission in 1985 even saw itself taken to the European Court of 
Justice for raising immigration and integration related issues with member states as a violation of 
                                                     
1 I would like to acknowledge the support of Asli Okyay, former graduate student of the Department of Political Science and 
International Relations and author of the Master of Arts thesis entitled The Evolution of Immigration and Asylum Policies 
in the European Union from a Public Good-Collective Action Perspective (Boğaziçi University, 2007) to the research of 
this paper. The ideas developed in this report were presented and debated at a number of seminars and conferences such 
as “Immigrants as Citizens”, University of Sydney, 6-7 October 2007 and the Salzburg Seminar “Session 440: 
Immigration and Inclusion: Rethinking National Identity”, 27 March – 1 April 2007. I would like to thank all those 
participants who listened to my presentations and offered to me their advice and opinion. I would especially like to thank 
CARIM for giving me the possibility to write this report.  
2 J. Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States (New York: Palgrave, 2004) 
Appendix 1. 
3 European Parliament resolution on strategies and means for the integration of immigrants in the European Union 
(2006/2056(INI)), adopted 6 July 2006, Paragraph G. 
4 A. Geddes, The Politic s of Migration and Immigration in Europe (London: Sage, 2007), Chp. 6.  
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member state competences. Yet, member states have since 2004 accepted a greater role for the EU in 
designing their integration policies. The JHA Council adopted, in November 2004, a set of Common 
Basic Principles (CBPs) to guide the integration policies of member countries.5 The Commission on 
its part prepares annual reports on migration and integration and has also prepared two editions of a 
Handbook on Integration to offer guidance for member states in formulating and implementing their 
respective integration policies. More importantly in April 2007 the EU established a modest fund to 
support integration of TCNs.6  
These recent developments are a clear sign of a will on the part of member states not only to 
achieve a better integration of TCNs but also to cooperate more at the EU level. In that context the 
notion of approaching the integration of TCNs from a “two-way process” perspective is very critical. 
This CBP includes the idea that a successful policy inevitably has to view the integration exercise as a 
process that engages both the immigrant as well as the host society.7 In other words it is a process that 
has to engage both sides and whose objective is to reach in the long run a stage of better integration at 
both ends. In this respect considerable emphasis is laid on making sure that the design and 
implementation of integration policies involves the immigrants themselves. The process also expects 
and encourages greater interaction between immigrants and the host society in an effort to address the 
many problems and challenges that immigrant communities are facing. Yet, what seems to be 
conspicuously missing is the role that sending countries could play in assisting the integration of their 
current or former nationals.  
Traditionally, sending countries and especially their governments have been seen as part of the 
“integration” problem. In the current EU integration policy sending countries’ role is construed in 
terms of controlling and curbing immigration, supporting return migration and to a limited extend 
assisting local development. The latter task is seen very much as a long term measure to help reduce 
unwanted migratory pressures from the sending country to the EU. However, the role of the sending 
country could also be envisaged from a much broader perspective. Often sending countries are facing 
and addressing problems similar to the ones that immigrants and their host societies encounter. They 
too suffer from violations of women’s rights, honor killings, ensuring the education of girls etc… 
They may not always be successful in resolving these problems but they may actually have an 
experience that if shared could benefit host societies’ efforts to develop effective integration policies. 
At a time when transnationalism has become an integral part of many immigrant communities in 
Europe, engaging sending countries at both civil society and governmental levels could indeed create a 
“win-win” situation for all parties involved.  
Therefore this paper is going to advocate the idea that the “two way process” approach should 
boldly be replaced by the notion of a “three way” approach for the better incorporation of immigrants. 
This would mean the engagement of not just the immigrants and the receiving country but also of 
actors and ideas from the sending one. The paper will develop this idea by reflecting on it from the 
Turkish perspective. Turkey is a country from where an important proportion of the current 
immigrants and TCNs in the EU come, and there is also a general image that Turkish immigrants do 
not fare well in respect to integration. Turkey is also engaged by the European Union for possible 
eventual membership. This has of course led to major transformations in Turkey. Today, a vibrant 
civil society has emerged often addressing and trying to deal with problems that resemble those that 
                                                     
5 Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of 19 November 2004, Common Basic Principles on Integration, Council 
Document 14615/04. 
6 Council Decision establishing the European Fund for the Integration of third country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 
as part of the General Programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’. Brussels, 18 April 2007, 16923/06. 
7 It is interesting to note that the idea of integration being a “two way process” figures at the very top of 11 CBPs elaborated 
in considerable detail in the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Common Agenda for Integration - 
Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union. COM (2005) 389 final, Brussels, 1 
September 2005.  
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host societies face with their immigrant communities experiencing integration problems. The 
government is also changing and showing increasing signs of wanting to play a more constructive role 
in addressing the problems of Turkish immigrant societies across Europe. Actually, the prime minister, 
Tayip Erdoğan, as well as the former minister of foreign affairs and the current president of Turkey, 
Abdullah Gül, on a number of occasions, during their visits in Europe, have emphasized the 
importance they give to integration and especially to learning the local language. 
This paper is divided in to three parts. The first part will survey the emergence of a “common” 
immigration and integration policy at the EU level, its main features and in particular the role of the 
European Commission in the shaping of this policy. The second part will critically examine the place 
that is attributed to sending countries in efforts to draw up a “common” immigration and integration 
policy. Particular emphasis will be given to exploring the way in which the EU defines and frames the 
place and function of “sending countries” in its immigration policy. In the last section the role that 
sending countries could play in the context of a “three way” approach to integration will be explored 
through the experience of Turkey. In this section a number of concrete suggestions will be made in 
support of a “three way” approach to addressing the challenges of better incorporating Turkish 
immigrants into mainstream life within the EU.  
Common immigration policy and integration: 
The adoption of the Single European Act and the decision to complete the internal market by 
removing the frontiers between EU member states raised simultaneously the issue of how to regulate 
the movement of TCNs in and out of EU geography. Until then member states had been dealing 
individually with these matters, and these policy issues had constituted so far a well-established and 
entrenched aspect of national sovereignty. The actual removal of internal frontiers brought up the need 
to take concerted or coordinated action not only in respect to a common visa policy but also in respect 
to asylum and illegal migration. The Schengen meeting of 1985 among a group of EU member 
countries and their efforts to coordinate policies in anticipation of the imminent removal of internal 
frontiers was a precursor to the mounting need for a common approach. By introducing the third pillar, 
the Maastricht Treaty aimed at addressing precisely this increasing need. However, the third pillar 
allowed only for a very strict inter-governmentalist approach. The actual major breakthrough came 
with the Amsterdam Treaty that opened the possibility to move these issues to the first pillar and 
allowed the Commission to enjoy some rights. The Commission was also allowed to set up a Justice 
and Home Affairs Directory that would very quickly become an important advocate and developer of 
“common” policies. The Treaty also foresaw the right for the Commission to initiate legislation and 
the possibility for qualified majority voting, five years after the coming into force of the Treaty. In that 
respect the Tampere Programme adopted in October 1999 by the European Council was an important 
turning point as it aspired to put into place a first generation of EU common asylum and visa policy by 
2004, and also to start addressing broader migration issues.8  
In stark contrast to the above developments, acknowledging that there was a serious common 
problem concerning the incorporation of immigrants in many of the EU member countries 
encountered resistance. Member countries by and large refused to recognise that there was an 
integration problem, and furthermore resisted the idea of addressing such a problem at the 
“community” level. The Commission flagged out that immigrants from third countries were 
experiencing integration problems particularly in relation to the labour markets of member states as 
early as 1985.9 The Commission linked these problems to the major structural transformations in the 
economies of leading European countries occurring since the mid-1970s. These transformations had 
                                                     
8 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, 15 and 16 October 1999. 
9 European Commission. Communication transmitted to the Council on March 1985, Guidelines for a Community Policy on 
Migration. COM (85) 48 final, Brussels, 20 February 1985. 
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left the immigrants unable to develop new skills to enter successfully the labour market. In addition to 
that, high levels of unemployment coinciding with growing immigration waves to EU member states 
aggravated lingering problems. The Commission advocated that it was necessary to take action at the 
Community level to deal with the challenges of integrating immigrants into the labour market. It 
argued that these challenges existed in all member countries and demonstrated low labour market 
integration was closely linked to low socio-economic performance as well as educational and 
linguistic problems. This in turn was complicating the possibility of contacts between immigrants and 
the broader society as well as exacerbating the problems of isolation and alienation. The Commission 
went on to suggest that the right to free movement that Community nationals enjoyed should be 
extended to legally resident TCNs and that measures should be adopted to ensure equal treatment and 
equal life standards.  
Subsequently, a proposal for a Council Decision by the Commission that would have set up a prior 
communication and consultation procedure on migration provoked a crisis between the Commission 
and some member states. These states considered the Commission’s intervention as unacceptable. 
They complained to the ECJ arguing that this intervention violated the Commission’s powers as 
defined by the Rome Treaty.10 The eventual ruling of the ECJ in 1987 did prevent the Commission’s 
efforts from gaining competence over immigration related issues.11 However, this did not lead the 
Commission to give up its interest in the issue of the integration of TCNs. Instead against the 
background of the adoption of the Single European Act, the Commission went ahead and adopted 
another Communication on immigration in October 1991.12 In this Communication, the Commission 
developed ideas about possible measures to control and manage new migration flows. At the same 
time in a rather avant garde manner, the Commission also argued for the need to adopt a joint 
approach towards the integration of existing legal migrants in place of the emphasis put on return 
migration by some leading member states. Some of the ideas associated with the CBPs adopted in 
2004 were raised in this Communication. The need to grant TCNs new economic and social rights 
including a right to family reunification was also discussed. With this Communication, the 
Commission was tackling areas that bypassed mere labour market integration and that touched upon 
social and cultural aspects of integration.  
This second challenge by the Commission was pretty much ignored by the Council and member 
states. The adoption of the Maastricht Treaty did not seem to change matters either. The Council and 
member states remained focused on the control aspects of migration and the actual management of the 
consequences of a common external border in terms of asylum, illegal migrations and visas. However, 
the Commission again did not give up, and in February 1994, it adopted another Communication 
addressing, inter alia, the integration of legal residents and the improvement of the situation of 
TCNs.13 This Communication can also be seen as the first major EU document that introduced the idea 
of integration being a “two way process” between the immigrant and the host society. Integration 
actually was defined as “offering migrants and their descendants the opportunity to live ‘normally’ in 
the host country. (…) From the immigrants themselves it requires the willingness to adapt to the 
lifestyle of the host society without losing their cultural identity and acceptance of the fact that 
                                                     
10 A. Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Towards a Fortress Europe? (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000), p. 7, and D. Papademetriou, Coming together or Pulling a part? The European Union’s Struggle with 
Immigration and Asylum (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, International Migration Policy 
Program, 1996), p. 21. 
11 M. Uğur, “Freedom of Movement vs. Exclusion: A Reinterpretation of the ‘Insider’ – ‘Outsider’ Divide in the European 
Union” International Migration Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1995), p. 984. 
12 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Right of 
Asylum. SEC [91] 1857 final, Brussels, 11 October 1991. 
13 European Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, 
COM [94] 23 final, Brussels, 23 February 1994.  
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equality of rights entails equality of obligations.”14 The Communication in this respect provided a long 
list of measures to improve the situation of legal immigrants including calling on the Council to take 
action in terms of fighting racism and xenophobia. This coincided with a period when Europe was 
experiencing a rise in racist attacks on immigrants coming especially from outside Europe.  
The Council and member states did not treat this Communication very differently from the earlier 
ones. Instead a JHA Council in June 1994 adopted a Resolution restricting rather than facilitating the 
accessibility of job vacancies to TCNs.15 Member states’ disinterest in addressing the issue of 
immigrants’ integration at the Community level was also reflected in the conspicuous absence of the 
matter in the European Council summits. The Presidency’s conclusions of summits just preceding the 
Amsterdam Treaty focused by and large on the restriction of new immigrant flows and the 
management of asylum waves. The intergovernmental conference drafting the Amsterdam Treaty paid 
neither much attention to the legal rights of TCNs nor to the issue of their better integration. The sole 
exception in this regard was the document adopted by the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal 
Affairs of the European Parliament. The Committee noted that it “considers it necessary to lay down 
rules governing relations with third countries, define the rights and obligations of citizens of third 
countries resident in the Union and encourage their integration.”16 
The Treaty of Amsterdam reflected a new mood among member states. Important steps were taken 
to communitarise policies in the area of asylum, border control and visa related issues. However, the 
issue of immigrant integration and the improvement of immigrants’ rights continued to receive less 
attention. Furthermore, the first set of issues was scheduled to be transferred to the First Pillar, and it 
was also convened that the subsequent decisions of the Council on these matters would be taken on a 
qualified majority basis five years after the coming into force of the Treaty. In stark contrast, issues 
relating to the immigrants’ status and their integration would remain strictly under the Third Pillar. 
Yet, one important development would be the extension of the Commission’s powers of initiating 
legislation accompanied by the establishment of the Directorate General (DG) for Justice and Home 
Affairs. The DG became an active and important vehicle in raising attention on integration related 
issues by adopting reports as well as developing informal links with interested non-governmental 
organisations and local governments. In this way the Commission began to fulfill an important agenda 
setting task. Even if the Amsterdam Treaty did not grant the Commission any rights to initiate 
legislation in the area of integration issues, the Commission did contribute to developing a common 
framework and set of networks between member states to foster and share best practices in respect to 
integration. These efforts were also followed by activities involving monitoring as well as funding of 
integration projects and policies.  
In the post-Amsterdam period there were various modest but important developments in respect to 
addressing integration problems, and improving the rights of immigrants legally residing in the EU. 
The adoption of the Tampere Programme in October 1999 was a critical turning point. This Program 
for legislative action for the next five years primarily focused on issues dealing with border control, 
security, asylum, and migration policies. At the same time, it did call though for decisions and 
measures to ensure a fairer treatment of third country nationals and approximation of their rights with 
that of EU citizens. Furthermore, the Programme encouraged the development of common principles 
for the better integration of TCNs. These decisions gave the Commission the impetus to initiate a 
legislative process culminating in the adoption of four Directives with important consequences for the 
integration of TCNs. The first set of Directives adopted in June and November 1999 related to the 
issues of ensuring equal access to employment and related issues as well as combating discrimination 
on the basis of ethnic or racial origin. Although these directives aimed primarily at fighting 
                                                     
14 P. 32. 
15 Papademetriou, p. 87. 
16 Opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs (04/05/95) cited in European Parliament, 
Intergovernmental Conference Briefing, No. 39: Asylum and Immigration Policy, 22 August 1996. 
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discrimination in general, they nevertheless had important significance in terms of the rights of legal 
immigrants in the EU.17  
The adoption of the next Directive related to the right to family reunification. The Commission 
considered the right to marry or to live together with one’s family as an indispensable part of the 
integration process. However, some member states showed resistance to the terms of the 
Commission’s proposal. This resistance included issues such as the maximum age of children that 
could benefit from reunification and the duration of stay by family members to qualify as long-term 
residents. This was also then accompanied with demands for some room for unilateral national 
legislation. As a result, the Commission saw itself putting forward three sets of proposals in December 
1999, October 2000 and then in May 2002 to accommodate member state demands. The Directive on 
the right to family reunification was finally adopted in September 2003 but fell well short of the 
Commission’s initial proposal.18 Lastly, the Commission’s proposal of March 2001 concerning the 
status of TCNs who are long-term residents also encountered difficulties, and could only be adopted in 
November 2003. The Directive did though provide for the equal treatment of TCNs with EU nationals 
with respect to employment, social security, tax benefits, access to public goods including housing, 
freedom of association and education.19 However, the Directive also gave the possibility to limit these 
rights by member states. In contrast to the original proposal, the Directive also brought limitation to 
the right of TCNs to move and reside in another member state. Furthermore, the member states also 
succeeded in excluding refugees from the Directive. The Directive, though an important step in the 
direction of providing a legal basis for a better integration of TCNs, fell short of what the Commission 
had advocated.20  
The Commission was less successful with its proposal of an “Open Method of Cooperation for the 
Community Immigration Policy.” The Commission with this proposal had hoped to assist member 
states through guidelines, national action plans, information exchange and reports to develop their own 
policies in a more coordinated manner on the issues covered by Tampere including the issue of the 
immigrants’ integration.21 Yet, the proposal was rejected by the Council. Nevertheless, the Danish and 
Greek presidencies took interest in immigration related issues. Both presidencies encouraged 
conferences which addressed immigration related issues including the problem of the immigrants’ 
integration in general as well as into the labour market. It is against this background that the 
Commission was able to prepare its most elaborate document thus far on the idea of a common 
approach to the integration of immigrants, almost a decade after it had first tried to raise the attention 
of member states to the issue of integration. In its Communication on Immigration, Integration and 
Employment of June 2003, the Commission surveyed the problem of integration across member states 
stressing how the problem was common across many countries. The Commission especially drew 
attention to low language competences, high levels of unemployment and poor educational 
performance among immigrants in the EU and stressed the need to act collectively at the EU level to 
address these problems. The Communication went ahead to define integration as “a two way process 
based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and 
                                                     
17 “Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin,” Official Journal of the European Union, no. L 180, 19 July 2000, and “Council 
Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation,” Official Journal of the European Union, no. L 303, 2 December 2000. 
18 “Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification,” Official Journal of the 
European Union, no. L 251, 3 October 2003.  
19 “Council Directive 2003/109/EC of November 25 2003 concerning the status of third country nationals who are long-term 
residents,” Official Journal of the European Union, no. L16, 1 January 2004. 
20 Louise Halleskov, “The Long-Term Residents Directive: A Fulfillment of Tampere Objective of Near Equality?” 
European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 7, (2005). 
21 European Commission, Communication from the Commission, to the Council and the European Parliament: An Open 
Method of Coordination for the Community Immigration Policy, COM (2001) 387 final, Brussels, 11 July 2001.  
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the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant.”22 Roughly a decade after its 
initial appearance, the concept of a “two way” approach to integration had made its comeback, this 
time in a more receptive environment.  
This idea was also coupled with the need to take a holistic approach to integration. The 
Commission in this case stressed the necessity of focusing not only on social and economic areas of 
integration but also on areas touching upon cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, participation 
and political rights. The introduction of the idea of “two way” and “holistic” approaches to the policy 
debate on integration at the EU level can be considered as a major success on the part of the 
Commission. This is particularly significant considering that until less than a decade ago member 
states energetically objected to seeing the issue of “integration” being addressed at the EU level. 
Furthermore, they were not receptive to the idea that both the state and society would need to make an 
effort to engage immigrants in the exercise of integration. The general consensus then in many of the 
leading member states with a large immigrant population was still based on the idea of the temporary 
presence of immigrants and that those who would stay would basically need to assimilate.  
The Communication was subsequently followed by a decision of the Thessaloniki Council to 
coordinate integration policies of member states by establishing National Contact Points on 
Integration. Governmental as well as civil society representatives and experts gathered in seminars and 
workshops to share information and projects about immigrant integration and also codify good 
practices. These efforts culminated in November 2004 in the publication of the first Handbook on 
Integration as a guide for policy makers.23 Another instrument that was developed as a consequence of 
the Communication was the practice of preparing Annual Reports on Migration and Integration. Three 
of such reports that have been prepared by the European Commission so far aim at monitoring national 
policy implementations on integration and highlighting good practices in member states.24 
Another significant breakthrough at the EU level came in November 2004 in the form of the Hague 
Programme prepared by the Dutch Presidency. The Programme identifies a set of policy priorities in 
respect to the creation of an area of justice, freedom and security. Among these priorities, the fifth one 
emphasizes the need to increase the contribution of migration to society and economy of member 
states.25 In order to achieve this priority the Programme also envisaged the establishment of a 
Coherent European Framework for Integration as well as a European Fund for Integration. The Fund 
was adopted in 2007 subsequent to the proposal prepared by the European Commission in April 
2005.26 Most importantly, after the call by the European Council summit in the Hague, the JHA 
Council of 19 November 2004 adopted a set of Common Basic Principles (CBPs). The Commission 
                                                     
22 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Immigration, Integration and Employment, COM 
(2003) 336 final, Brussels, 3 June 2003, p.17.  
23 Jan Niessen and Yongmi Schibel, Handbook on Integration for Policy Makers and Practitioners (Migration Policy Group 
prepared for the European Commission Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security, November 2004). A 
second edition of the Handbook was published in May 2007. 
24 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: the First Annual Report, COM (2004) 508 final, 
Brussels, 16 July 2004. The second and third reports were published in June 2006 and September 2007 respectively. 
25 See “Integration: Maximising the Positive Impact of Migration on our Society and Economy,” European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The Hague Programme: Ten 
Priorities for the Next Five Years-A Partnership for European Renewal COM (2005) 184 final, Brussels, 10 May 2005, 
p. 9. 
26 Council Decision establishing the European Fund for the Integration of third country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 
as part of the General Programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’, Brussels, 18 April 2007, 16923/06. 
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then developed a Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration which expanded on these 
principles.27  
This Communication elaborates in great detail on measures that could guide member states’ policy 
in respect to the immigrants’ integration. Noteworthy is that the very first “principle” is actually the 
principle that ‘Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants 
and residents of Member States’. This principle is followed by others that clearly aim at encouraging 
policies so as to involve immigrants in all aspects of life in host societies. The Commission goes into 
considerable detail in listing recommendations ranging from the need to improve the linguistic skills 
of immigrants to encouraging greater contact between immigrants and the host society. The 
Commission even makes as bold a suggestion as the need to introduce measures at the national level 
“strengthening the ability of the host society to adjust to diversity by targeting integration actions at 
the host population.”28 The list clearly builds on the experience of preparing the Handbook for 
Integration and the thinking that has gone into operationalising the idea of integration as a “two way 
process.” Yet, what is striking is that no thought appears to have been given to the role that sending 
countries might or could play in respect to assisting their nationals’ integration or their descendents in 
EU member countries. At a time when a widespread recognition prevails that immigrants in general 
tend to maintain close links with their country of origin and that transnationalism is a conspicuous 
characteristic of immigration, this silence becomes quite puzzling.  
Place of sending countries: 
One of the striking aspects of the Tampere Programme of 1999 is that it identifies the need to develop 
“partnerships with countries of origin and third countries” as among one of the very first task to be 
addressed in developing “a common EU asylum and migration policy.” The Hague Programme (2004) 
goes one step further and introduces the idea of developing an “external dimension” to EU “common 
migration policy.” This means establishing a direct link between this “common” policy and other EU 
policy areas, such as enlargement, European neighborhood policy, development assistance, that bring 
the EU into contact with third countries especially third countries that happen to be immigration or 
transit countries. This section aims at exploring, with the help of a close study of a selection of EU 
documents addressing migration issues, the manner in which the content and nature of these 
“partnerships” is framed. The EU envisages three types of partnerships.29  
The first type of partnership concerns the “management of migration” into third countries. These 
are countries from where migration to the EU occurs in the form of direct, legal or illegal migration of 
nationals or in the form of transit migration of asylum seekers or illegal migrants. European 
Commission Communication on The Global Approach to Migration one year on, for example, 
identifies “Romania, Morocco, Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine and Russia” as countries from where “most 
important flows” originated in 2004.30 The list of course is not limited to these countries, and in the 
documents that have been examined, there are references to Asian countries such as China as well as 
African countries. The partnership is envisaged in the form of agreements involving return procedures, 
                                                     
27 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Common Agenda for Integration - Framework for 
the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union. COM (2005) 389 final, Brussels, 1 September 2005. 
28 Ibid p. 5. 
29 This list of selected documents can be seen in Appendix I. These documents were closely studied to determine the way in 
which the nature of cooperation and partnerships between the EU and third countries is actually framed and defined. 
Particular attention was given to identify the areas of cooperation and the nature of the cooperation. 
30 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The Global 
Approach to Migration one Year on: Towards a Comprehensive European Migration Policy. COM(2006) 735 final, 
Brussels, 30 November 2006, p. 2. 
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conclusion of readmission agreements, combating human smuggling and enhancing border control of 
these countries. The fourth priority of the Hague Programme lays out the contours of such 
partnerships.31 The Annex of this document, in turn, lists the numerous policy oriented steps to be 
developed. One concrete manifestation of such steps is the European Commission’s Communication 
on Policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third-country nationals.32 The 
Communication is important as an instrument that reveals the form and content of the “partnership” as 
one that very much shifts the burdens of “managing migratory flows” on the target country. Such a 
one-sided conceptualisation of “partnership” is recognised by the European Commission in its 
Communication on The Global Approach to Migration one year on.  
Hence it is not surprising that the Commission advocates the need to provide, for example, through 
the Action Plans of the European Neighborhood Policy, “financial assistance in order to strengthen the 
capabilities of these countries to manage migration more effectively.” Furthermore, it also recognises 
the need for further incentives when it notes that “experiences have demonstrated that to broker a deal 
the EU needs to offer something in return.”33 These developments seem to suggest that the notion of 
“partnerships” is very much framed from the perspective of the receiving country. In fact, sending and 
transit countries have little of a say beyond expecting the EU to contribute to the cost of 
“management” of migration and at best bargain a deal that might bring some benefits to their country 
and nationals. The effort to develop these “partnerships” at the EU level is still in its early stages, and 
the approach to “managing migration” may gradually evolve in the direction of a “partnership” that 
both sides may define, frame and shape together.  
The second area of partnership envisaged by the EU is in the context of linking migration and 
development together. The link between the two had long been ignored by the “development 
community.” However, in the course of the last decade the relationship between the two has started to 
receive growing attention.34 There had long been a recognition that development does lead to rural to 
urban migration and then also to emigration.35 However, more recently, considerable effort has been 
mobilised, notably in policy circles, so as to develop ideas and policy instruments that may achieve the 
reverse effect. Development has come to be seen as a means to partly transforming emigration 
countries, reducing, and preferably preventing unwanted migration into affluent countries.36 In the EU, 
this relationship has been again approached from a “management of migration flows” perspective. The 
latter conceives this relationship as aiming to achieve two objectives. The first one is the idea that the 
EU could assist migrant communities in Europe to contribute directly to the development of their 
countries of origin. This would be achieved through facilitating the transfer of remittances and social 
capital as well as introducing programs to manage the adverse effects of “brain drain” and instead 
encourage return to foster brain gain. These measures in turn are to serve a second and much more 
important objective of controlling and reducing the pressure to emigrate through bringing about 
development in emigration countries.  
The European Commission in its Migration and Development Communication develops a series of 
policy oriented ideas to assist development in countries of origin with especially the contribution of 
                                                     
31 COM (2005) 184, 10 May 2005, pp. 8-9. 
32 COM(2006) 402, 19 July 2006. 
33 COM(2006) 735, 30 November 2006 , p. 5 and p. 9. 
34 H. Olesen, “Migration Return and Development: An Institutional Perspective” International Migration, Vol. 40, No. 5, 
2002, p. 126. 
35 D. S. Massey et al, Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the end of the Millennium (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998). 
36 M. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London and New York: 
Zed Books, 2001), and J. Widgren and P. Martin, “Managing Migration: The Role of Economic Instruments” 
International Migration, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2002. 
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members from migrant communities.37 It offers the possibility of “helping developing countries map 
their diasporas and build links with them” (p. 5), facilitate “return migration” (p.7) and mitigate “the 
adverse effect of brain drain” as well as foster “institutional partnerships” (p.8). The Communication 
elaborates on these measures in an Annex. These measures are all construed and framed in a manner 
that aims at demonstrating a “generous” and “unselfish” effort on the part of the EU to contribute to 
the development of third countries. Even if the “real” objective is obviously to control and if possible 
discourage emigration, nowhere is this openly mentioned. However, the manner in which the term 
“management of migration flows” is employed leaves little doubt that the objective is control and 
prevention. Furthermore, there is no attempt to address the possibility or the notion that third countries 
that need “development” may themselves have something to contribute to the EU’s efforts to “manage 
migration.” The exception is the reference in the Communication to the need to “build on the best 
practices that have been or are being developed by individual Member States or by non-State actors 
and should also learn from practices in other parts of the world, including in developing countries” 
when formulating EU policy in this area.38 Yet neither this Communication nor any of the other 
documents consulted elaborate upon what the contribution from developing countries might be and 
how that could be sought. This attitude is also reflected when the Communication with some 
enthusiasm refers to a specific project funded “under EC budget line B7-667” that engages “highly 
skilled members of the Moroccan Diaspora in France set up innovative start-ups in Morocco.” Yet 
again the idea that the opposite might also be possible and that highly skilled nationals from Morocco 
could indeed offer ideas to the EU in how to pursue the relationship between “development and 
migration” is not envisaged.  
The third area of partnership that is least developed but increasingly highlighted is legal economic 
migration. This is a particularly sensitive area as admission of economic migrants remains under the 
competence of member states. However, the Hague Programme does call for the need to address the 
issue at the EU level and encourages the European Commission to initiate a debate on economic 
migration into the EU. In this regard the Commission adopted a Green Paper on an EU approach to 
managing economic migration so as to lead this debate and develop policy recommendations.39 This 
has subsequently led to the adoption of the Communication on Policy Plan on Legal Migration that 
constituted the first step to prepare proposals for directives to govern legal migration.40 The EU hopes 
in this area to address two objectives: on the one hand the consequences of a declining population in 
most EU member countries and hence the need for labour and on the other hand the “fight against 
illegal immigration and employment, including trafficking.”41 
This third area of partnership does not only aim to develop instruments in order to encourage 
countries of origin to cooperate with the EU in combating illegal migration but also to give to these 
countries the possibility of legal migration for their nationals as an incentive. The emphasis is however 
very much put on the idea of temporary and circular rather than permanent migration. There is clearly 
a concern to avoid the experience of the 1960s and 1970s that saw the arrival of the so called “guest 
workers” that then constituted the formation of today’s large immigrant communities. The 
Communication on circular migration tries to develop the modalities for this kind of migration and 
does attempt to frame it in a spirit of mutually beneficial cooperation by referring to the notion of 
                                                     
37 COM (2005) 390, 1 September 2005. 
38 Ibid, p. 3. 
39 European Commission, Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration, COM (2004), 811 Final, 
Brussels, 11 January 2005. 
40 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Policy Plan on Legal Migration 
 COM (2005), 669 Final, Brussels, 21 December 2005. 
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“mobility partnerships.”42 However, a close reading of the Communication reveals that once more 
“control and security” concerns shape the motivation behind the EU efforts. The Communication notes 
that circular migration will be made available in accordance to “the level of commitments which the 
third country is ready to take on in terms of action against illegal migration and facilitating 
reintegration of returnees, including efforts to provide returnees with employment opportunities.” 43 
The Communication goes on to elaborate at least eight commitments that third countries would have 
to meet before being included in the scheme and allowed to enjoy the benefits of circular migration. 
The Communication does then go on to develop an impressive set of measures or promises for third 
countries that the EU would introduce to realise circular migration. These measures also include “visa 
facilitation agreements” possibly the most important and tangible prize in terms of many third 
countries whose nationals have to have a Schengen visa before they can enter the EU.  
In relation to “legal and economic migration”, compared to the other two sets of “partnerships”, the 
European Commission appears to be much more conscious of wanting to create a genuinely “win-win” 
and balanced approach to cooperation between the EU and third countries. Of course whether this 
approach will indeed be adopted by member states, translated into policy and actually implemented, 
has yet to be seen. In the case of the other two areas, the emphasis remains clearly on “control and 
security” and third countries’ role remains framed as a passive one with little to gain and benefit from 
the partnership other than in terms of acquiring and strengthening the tools of “control” in “managing 
migration flows.” The attitude of treating countries of origin as passive becomes even more 
conspicuous in the case of the “integration and incorporation” of third country nationals and migrants 
coming from outside Europe. In stark contrast to the aforementioned three issues of “migration” in the 
area of “integration”, no form of “partnership” is actually envisaged, and the notion is utterly missing 
in related EU documents. This is particularly puzzling considering the emphasis that the EU has put 
recently on the idea of a “global and comprehensive approach to migration”. The absence of 
“countries of origin” from the debate and from the efforts to develop policies of “integration” is 
noteworthy.  
The idea that academics, non-governmental organisations let alone governmental institutions and 
officials from third countries, may actually have something to contribute to the efforts in EU member 
countries so as to better integrate their nationals or former nationals into mainstream life appears to be 
completely absent in the EU thinking on this issue. The leading EU document that is supposed to 
shape member state policies towards the issue of “integration” is the Common Basic Principles on 
Integration formally adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in November 2004.44 These 
principles were subsequently elaborated upon by the European Commission in the Communication on 
A Common Agenda for Integration - Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the 
European Union.45 It has already been mentioned earlier that the CBPs is to a large extent 
revolutionary in the sense that at the top of the list of principles is included the idea that for 
“integration” to be successful, the process needs to be a “two-way process” encompassing the 
migrants as well as the host society. However, neither in the CBPs adopted by the Council nor in the 
Commission Communication is it possible to see any reference or allusion to the notion of a “three 
way” approach. In other words, the idea that the sending country or actors from the sending countries 
could be engaged in the debate on policy formulation and that the sending countries may have a 
contribution or some positive role to play is not entertained.  
                                                     
42 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: On Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships 
between the European Union and Third Countries, COM (2007) 248 final, Brussels, 16 May 2007. 
43 Ibid, p. 3. 
44 Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of 19 November 2004, Common Basic Principles on Integration, Council 
Document 14615/04. 
45 COM (2005) 389 final, Brussels, 1 September 2005. 
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The only context in which the country of origin implicitly enters the CBPs is in respect to the 
fourth one. This principle states that “basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and 
institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is 
essential to successful integration.” In relation to this principle, the Commission in the Annex of A 
Common Agenda for Integration suggests the following: “As managed migration schemes are 
established, and within the context of developing a European approach to the admission of migrants, 
there is scope for paying more attention to pre-departure measures which can improve the 
integration process on arrival.”46 There is no elaboration offered on whether actors from the country of 
origin might have a role in formulating or shaping and implementing these pre-departure measures 
(Emphasis in original text). However, the tone and wording of these remarks give a distinct impression 
that neither the preparation nor the implementation of “pre-departure measures” would engage the 
sending country.  
European Commission’s Global Approach to Migration one year on is another critical document 
that is silent on the role of the sending countries in respect to “integration”. Actually, this 
Communication has the objective of evaluating EU efforts in developing a “global and comprehensive 
approach” to migration. The document is striking in terms of the emphasis it puts on “control and 
security” dimension of migration. This is especially reflected in Annex B of the document that lists the 
work carried out in the EU in 2006. A good proportion of the work that is referred to appears to have 
had a security and control related agenda, and the impressive number of meetings held with 
representatives of African and neighboring countries seem also to reflect such a priority. None of these 
meetings appear to have addressed the role that sending countries might play in respect to 
“integration.” This is somewhat surprising because under the subheading “Reinforcing Coherence: A 
Comprehensive European Migration Policy” the document does explore future steps to be taken in 
respect to “integration and intercultural dialogue.”47 In this section the Commission foresees to 
develop instruments that “will allow for wider participation of the different stakeholders, including 
migrants themselves, thus contributing to the promotion of an effective integration strategy.” (P.8, 
emphasis in original text). The Commission also makes references to the awaited recommendations of 
the “High Level Group on the Social Integration of Ethnic Minorities and their Full Access to the 
Labour Market” and the 'European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008'. However, it is not clear 
whether any of these activities will indeed involve any consideration of the role that sending countries 
might be able to play.  
The Communication on Global Approach to Migration one year is not the only EU document that 
seems to come close to considering the idea of a “three way approach” to integration but obviously 
falls short of it. The case of “learning” from Moroccans has already been mentioned. The Council 
Decision establishing the European Fund for the Integration in April 2007 appears to have elements in 
its term of reference that may allow the funding of projects that could enable a “dialogue” on the 
“integration” of migrants to emerge.48 The funding of projects based on the idea of the “two way 
approach” to integration is openly encouraged by this decision. In Article 5-2b and 2c reference is 
made to transnational cooperation networks and awareness campaigns that could indeed open the way 
to exploring the idea of a “three way approach.” Beyond the Common Basic Principles on Integration 
is a document that was prepared by the European Policy Center and King Baudouin Foundation. This 
document appears to have played an important role in the debate and discussion process preceding the 
drawing up of the Commission A Common Agenda for Integration Communication. Temptingly this 
document comes close to the idea of a “three way approach.” The report actually says that “the 
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countries of origin should be considered as key actors in the development of integration policies” but 
then this role is restricted to ensuring that “immigrants are not cut off from their countries of origin.”  
Earlier in the report the notion that integration is a “two-way” process is diligently raised and actors 
representing migrants are defined as “actors of integration.” The report then goes on to add the 
importance of mobilising “untapped resources” such as migrant organizations in developing 
“integration” policies. Yet, the report stops short of openly advocating the idea that sending countries 
may have a role or contribution to the actual making and shaping of integration policies.49 Most 
striking in this respect is the silence of the report of the Global Commission on International 
Migration (GCIM) on such a possibility. It is noteworthy that this report was prepared after a 
long series of consultations, and that it is considered to be an avant garde report involving the 
contributions of experts and prominent personalities from across the world and including 
leading immigrant sending countries. This report highlights additionally the importance of the 
idea of the two-way approach to integration and considers that “integration is a long term and 
multi-dimensional process, requiring a commitment on the part of both migrants and non-
migrant members of society to respect and adapt to each other…” It goes on to stress the 
importance of local and national authorities to work with migrants and their associations and 
goes on to make suggestions on concrete measures that could be taken.50 Yet, neither in the 
section on “diversity and cohesion” nor in the rest of the report is there any reference 
attributing a potential role to countries of origin. 
The pattern that emerges from a study of a sample of EU document concerning the place of sending 
countries in the formulation of a “common migration policy” is fourfold. The EU is making a 
conscious effort to develop partnerships with such countries in respect to the “management of 
migration flows”, “development of legal migration” and “migration and development.” Secondly, this 
partnership is framed or defined in such a way that EU “control and security” concerns come before 
the interests or priorities of the sending countries. Thirdly, the partnership is defined very much in a 
hierarchical manner. The EU sets the agenda, and the EU is the active and the “giving” side of the 
partnership while the sending countries are construed as “passive” and/or at the “receiving” end. It is 
thus difficult to identify any signs of the idea that “sending countries” may have suggestions to make 
in the EU proposed “global and comprehensive approach” to migration. Fourthly, when it comes to the 
issue of “integration policies”, “sending countries” are not even in the picture at all. The thought that 
“countries of origin” might have even modest contributions to make in assisting host countries and 
societies in ensuring a better integration or incorporation of their nationals or former nationals into 
mainstream society is absent. 
The intriguing question of course is why this is the case. One major reason seems to do with the 
image, conviction and belief that “sending countries” and especially their governments are actually 
part of the “integration” problem. As Castles and Miller note an important aspect of the “age of 
migration” has been the way in which the politics of countries of origin have often been replayed 
sometimes violently among the immigrant communities especially in Europe. Furthermore, they also 
note the manner in which the governments of sending countries have also tried to “control” immigrant 
communities composed of their nationals especially against the influence from dissident groups and 
movements.51 Some governments were also actively involved, often in cooperation with host country 
governments, in running programs in order to address the cultural, educational and religious needs of 
the immigrants. Retrospectively these programs that were based on the assumption ─ especially in the 
Turkish case ─ that the immigrants were simply “guest-workers” and that one day they would return 
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possibly inadvertently undermined or complicated their incorporation into the host societies. The 
governments of Morocco and Turkey, two countries with large immigrant communities in Europe, 
were very much known for their policies geared towards controlling their nationals. Furthermore, 
these were two countries in which the absence of pluralist democracy and widespread human rights 
violations not only pushed people to flee to Europe but also facilitated the transposition of the conflicts 
at home on to the receiving countries. The fact that these are Muslim countries and that many in 
Europe associate integration problems to Islam has been an additional factor reinforcing the idea of the 
“sending country” being part of the problem. This has been particularly the case especially in relation 
to violation of women’s rights, domestic violence and the issue of honor killings.  
Another factor that may also help to understand why the notion that countries of origin could not 
make a positive contribution is what might be best described as “Euro-centrism” or “Euro-centric” 
view of the world that dominates the thinking of most European decision makers. This can be seen as 
a contemporary manifestation of the good old 19th century belief that the world beyond Europe needs 
Europe to assist it to modernise, to develop and catch up with Europe. The reverse, that is the idea that 
sending countries or people from such countries may have the experience, the knowledge, the social 
capital, the expertise etc… that could indeed help to resolve European problems, seems to be thought 
as being simply unthinkable. Nationals of traditional emigration countries are more often imagined or 
construed as individuals who desperately need work, and that this work would inevitably be of an 
unskilled nature (the sort of individuals good at best for picking up fruits in European orchards). 
Another manifestation of “Euro-centrism” is the notion that countries and societies outside Europe do 
not change. The “integration” problems of immigrant communities aggravate this phenomenon as host 
societies often form and perpetuate their image of sending countries through the image of the 
problematic “immigrants” in their midst. Yet, at least some sending countries change and evolve, 
economically, politically and socially. After all, Greece, Spain, Portugal and even Italy, until only a 
few decades ago, were emigration countries themselves. They have changed and even drastically to 
the point of becoming immigration countries. These changes bring with them major transformations in 
the way countries of origin relate to their immigrant communities.  
In their edited book Migration and Development: Perspectives from the South, Castles and Delgado 
Wise offer contributions demonstrating the way in which five major emigration countries, India, 
Mexico, Morocco, Philippines and Turkey, have significantly changed their approach to their 
respective immigrant communities.52 By and large, all these countries approach their emigrants in a 
different way than it was the case in the past, and most governments actively court these communities 
for a variety of reasons ranging from economic and financial to social and political reasons. The 
relationship of control between the governments of sending countries and immigrant communities has 
been replaced by a much richer and diverse relationship. Democratisation and transition to liberal 
market economies have also had a deep impact on the form and nature of the relationships. 
Furthermore, transnationalism has also brought the immigrant communities into much greater contact 
and interaction with their countries of origin.  
Surely these kinds of transformations ought to open avenues that should allow the possibility of 
reframing the relationship between countries of origin and host societies in respect to addressing the 
problem of “integration.” Such a reframing could be reflected in the way the EU is defining its “global 
and comprehensive approach” to migration. This would call for a substantial reconsideration of the 
current approach that relegates sending countries to a passive position in respect to the formulation 
and implementation of policy on most migration and integration related issues. It would be necessary 
to recognise that some sending countries have changed, often significantly, and that actors from these 
countries, governmental as well as non-governmental, may provide constructive experience and 
knowledge to be shared with their counterparts in host countries. It is worth adding that this suggestion 
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is not an attempt to introduce actors from sending countries into the decision making process of EU 
host countries. Clearly the latter are very sensitive towards any intrusion into their national 
competences in respect to economic migration and integration policies. This is a well recognized 
given.  
Instead the idea proposed here would be to encourage, especially at the EU level, the evolution of 
the “two level approach” into a “three way approach”. This would simply mean that the EU would 
create possibilities for European actors, governmental and non-governmental, to interact and exchange 
views on how some of the “integration” problems might best be addressed and may be solved. 
Subsequently, it would be up to member states and EU institutions to decide whether these ideas are 
actually put into practice. In the meantime the “three way approach” would open the way to a much 
more balanced and fulfilling dialogue between the host country, the immigrants, and the country of 
origin that could indeed foster circumstances for a “win-win” outcome. The benefits would not be only 
restricted to the “integration” aspect of the migration agenda, but would spill over into the issues of the 
“management of migration flows”, “migration and development” as well as “legal migration.” This 
would also be closer to the spirit and letter of the notion of a “global and comprehensive approach.” 
Lastly, it would also contribute to confidence building between sending and host countries as well as 
between host countries and their immigrant communities.   
What form might a “three way approach” to integration take and in which concrete ways a sending 
country might be able to play a constructive role? The answer to these two questions will be explored 
by looking at the case of Turkey. Examining the case of Turkey is pertinent to explaining the 
importance of the idea of a “three way” approach to integration for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
immigrant community in Europe that has its origins in Turkey is one of the largest. Secondly, among 
the Muslim sending countries, Turkey is the one that has the closest and longest standing relations 
with some of the leading immigrant receiving countries of Europe. Furthermore, Turkey is engaged 
with the European Union in an accession process that is supposed to lead to membership, and hence 
one should expect a “deeper and more balanced” dialogue between Turkey and the EU on migration. 
Thirdly, “integration” problems ─ or at least part of them ─ that Turkish immigrant communities in 
Europe face are symptomatic of problems across other immigrant communities from Muslim 
countries. Finally, the engagement of Turkey by the EU as a candidate country since December 1999 
precipitated important reforms and changes in the country. In Turkey, there is now a lively civil 
society that partly deals or tries to address social problems somewhat similar to the ones one can find 
among Turkish immigrant communities in Europe. These problems range from the issue of domestic 
violence against women, honor killings, forced marriages and the need to improve the schooling of 
girls especially in eastern parts of the country to education in general. The Turkish state has also been 
transformed to an important extent. There is much more cooperation between civil society, domestic 
as well as international, and government agencies in addressing social and political problems. More 
importantly, the current government is much more open to the idea of addressing the “integration” 
problems of Turkish immigrant communities in Europe. Both Premier Tayip Erdoğan as well as the 
current president Abdullah Gül, the former minister of foreign affairs, have on numerous occasions 
called upon Turkish immigrants to make a greater effort to “integrate” 53 during their visits to EU 
member countries and especially to Germany. Less than a decade ago this would have not been usual, 
and the fact that this is advocated by a government that has an Islamist background lends additional 
significance to the matter.  
                                                     
53 A case in point is the speech that Erdoğan delivered at the opening of the Villa Turka in Berlin in November 2005 when he 
called on members of Turkish immigrants association as well as Turkish immigrants to learn the local language and 
become socially and politically active in host societies, See “Başbakan’dan AB’ye önemli çağrı” 6 November 2005 
accessed at: http://www.delikanforum.net/archive/index.php/t-38841.html. 
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The Turkish case 
The presence of almost 3,5 million Turks, including naturalised ones, in Europe has deeply marked 
European politics and social life.54 Many in Europe have highlighted the failure of Turkish immigrants 
to integrate into their host societies and have also used this to resist Turkey’s EU membership 
prospects. It is true that Turkish immigrants experience high levels of unemployment and many 
Turkish immigrant youth perform poorly at school. Arranged marriages and the serious problem of 
honor killings adversely affect public perceptions of Turkish immigrants. In parallel to the 
developments in Turkey, religion has also come to play an increasingly prominent role in the 
associational lives of many Turkish migrants. The Diyanet, (The Directorate of Religious Affairs), the 
Turkish national bureaucracy of religious affairs, which had previously dominated the religious lives 
of immigrant communities, was increasingly challenged by Milli Görüş (National View), an 
immigrant organisation with very close ties to political Islam in Turkey.55 For a long time Turkish 
immigrant civil society was organised very much around events and politics in Turkey rather than 
those of host communities. This situation is changing, as Turkish immigrants are becoming 
increasingly involved in local and national politics in the countries where they live.56 This of course 
has very important implications in terms of the integration process as well as in terms of the immigrant 
communities’ relations with the host state as well as Turkey.  
The problems of integration that Turkish immigrants face are complicated and diverse.57 Firstly, 
just as there are many unemployed and poorly-integrated Turkish immigrants in Europe, there are also 
Turkish immigrants who have fared well in their host countries, including Turkish businessmen that 
actually employ local and other immigrants in their businesses.58 Some of these immigrants have 
actually become major public figures and politicians at the local, national as well as at the European 
Parliament level. On the other hand, the absence of an environment that can be of assistance to 
addressing the challenges that immigrants face has long been a reason that has aggravated the problem 
of integration. Many European governments until recently failed to acknowledge that they had become 
immigration countries. Many also shied from adopting active policies to support integration of 
immigrants. Anti-immigrant politics and racism remain major challenges. Nevertheless, the long-
standing presence of immigrants is impacting on the culture of immigrants themselves as well as their 
host societies. A certain degree of cultural blending and interaction in the positive sense of the word 
does occur. 
However, the EU and in particular the efforts of the European Commission on “integration” is of 
paramount importance. Considering that member states have been very sensitive in avoiding any 
element of supranationalism creeping into their policies on migration, the progress covered so far in 
the first section of this paper is impressive. This is particularly so in terms of the way in which the 
notion of the “two way approach” to integration has become a well established principle. Furthermore, 
documents such as the Handbook on Integration and the Annual Reports on Integration are critical 
                                                     
54 For the complete figures see “Turkey – Table 1: Turkish Nationals Abroad by Host Countries (in thousands), 2000-2002” 
in A. Içduygu, ‘Turkey:’ P. Fargues (ed.) Mediterranean Migration Report 2005 (Florence: CARIM, European 
University Institute, The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 2005), p. 359. 
55 For the role of religion and transnationalism among the Turkish immigrant communities see G. Avcı, “Religion, 
Transnationalism and Turks in Europe” Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2005). 
56 G. Yurdakul, “State, Political Parties and Immigrant Elites: Turkish Immigrant Associations in Berlin” Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3, April 2006 and Z. Sezgin, Umbrella Organizations of Turkish Migrant (Final 
Report, Migration Research Program at the Koc University, Research Projects 2006-2007). 
57 For a detailed study of some of the problems see articles in Part II of R. Erzan and K. Kirişci (eds.) ‘Determinants of 
immigration and integration of Turkish immigrants in the European Union’, Turkish Studies, Special Issue, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
(March 2006). 
58 N. Abadan-Unat, Bitmeyen Göç (Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayınları, 2002) and A. Kaya and F. Kentel, Euro Turks: A 
Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the European Union? (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005). 
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contributions to improving “integration”. Yet, the introduction of the idea of “three way approach” 
would not only enrich the EU’s current efforts in the area of integration but it would serve the purpose 
of developing a “global and comprehensive approach” to migration. In the specific case of Turkey the 
“three way approach” could also create a tangible “win-win” situation for both sides. Turkey, at the 
governmental and civil society levels, could contribute to addressing and alleviating an old problem in 
Europe while at the same time help to create an adequate setting as to improve its image among the 
European public. In turn, a readiness on the part of the EU to take into account and include Turkey’s 
experience and knowledge and especially cooperate closely with government agencies and civil 
society would help to improve the deep mistrust felt towards the EU in Turkey.  
The section below explores activities in three different but related areas in Turkey that could 
benefit “integration” efforts in the EU. The first area relates to ensuring and promoting women’s rights 
in Turkey. Turkey has been one of the first countries in Europe, well before France for example, to 
grant to women the right to vote. Women have also enjoyed rights since the establishment of the 
Turkish republic in 1923 that women in many other, especially Muslim, countries lack to this day. 
However, there are still problems especially in respect to the actual practice and implementation of 
these rights.59 Domestic violence against women and especially honor killings is a particularly serious 
problem in Turkey. However, numerous Turkish non-governmental organizations together with 
international agencies such as the United Nations Population Fund and government agencies, 
especially the General Directorate on the status of women, have been engaged in numerous programs 
and campaigns.60 Every and each of these campaigns and programs is a reflection of the tremendous 
experience that is being accumulated in this area in Turkey. Still, the most striking one is the campaign 
launched to educate young Turkish conscripts about women’s rights. The campaign involves 
cooperation between the government, the military and various national and international civil society 
agencies.61 This campaign gains particular significance when one bears in mind how traditionally 
relations between the government and the military have not always been positive. Ironically, a 
government that is suspected by the military to have a hidden Islamist agenda and dominated by men 
has been able to develop such a campaign with the military, a male organization par excellence.  
The case of KAMER is also particularly interesting. KAMER is a non-governmental organisation 
based in Diyarbakır and active on the subject since the mid-1990s in a particularly difficult region of 
Turkey where violence against women and especially honor killings is endemic. KAMER, an 
organization led primarily by Kurdish women, some of whom have been from a very Kurdish 
nationalist background, works very closely with the Turkish police and Gendarmerie. A member of 
KAMER actually pointed out to the author of this report that they consider the police and the 
gendarmerie to be their best and helpful allies in improving the situation of women in the region. The 
same person, incidentally with impeccable pro-Kurdish credentials, added that they had the greatest 
problems with the PKK, the Kurdish nationalist separatist group, whose members frequently argued 
with members of KAMER that the time was not ripe for women’s rights and that priority should be 
given for the right to self-determination. Surely, the members of KAMER who operate under such 
difficult circumstances would have an important experience to share in respect to “integration” 
problems in Europe. However, this member of KAMER added that she had been invited to Europe to 
address the problems of immigrants only twice.62 On the occasion of her visit to Sweden, she had the 
distinct impression that her Swedish counterparts seemed very open and willing to benefit from her 
                                                     
59 Y. Arat, “Contestation and Collaboration: Women’s struggles for empowerment” in Turkey in R. Kasaba (ed.) Cambridge 
History of Turkey: Volume 4 (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
60 For a survey of the problem of violence against women in Turkey and efforts to improve the situation see A. G. Altınay 
and Y. Arat, Türkiye’de kadına yönelik şiddet ((Istanbul: Punto, 2007).  
61 On this particular campaign and its significance from the perspective of a woman journalist see M. Tamer, “Yetişkin Erkek 
Nasıl Eğitilir” Milliyet, 30 March 2006. 
62 Interview held in Diyarbakır in 2 November 2006. 
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experience. Yet, her experience in Holland was very different, and her hosts seemed much more 
interested on that occasion to hear from her on how Kurdish immigrants could be encouraged to return 
to Turkey rather than learn from her knowledge about how to promote women’s rights among 
immigrants.  
In the area related to the prevention of domestic violence, it was actually a Turkish daily Hürriyet, 
widely read by the Turkish immigrant community in Europe too, that came closest to putting the idea 
of a “three way approach” into practice. Hürriyet ran a series of conferences and meetings in Germany 
as part of a campaign it launched under the heading of “Aile İçi Şiddete Son!” (End to domestic 
violence within the family!) directed at the Turkish immigrants’ community. One of the meetings was 
actually attended by Maria Bühmer, the German state minister responsible for migration and 
integration. It is interesting that at this meeting the minister chose to note that “out of every four 
German women one is subject to domestic violence” and welcomed the campaign. Her Turkish 
counterpart, Nimet Çubukçu, state minister responsible for women and family affairs, in her speech 
stressed that she was ready to support efforts to learn from each other.63 A prominent Turkish female 
journalist reported the remarks of Walter Momper, speaker of the Berlin State Parliament, who 
maintained that he was impressed to see Turkish public opinion take interest in the problems of the 
West. The journalist clearly sensed the potential for a “three way approach” as she herself observed 
that Turkey owned up to a problem of Europe with this campaign.64 
A second area in which Turkey has developed considerable governmental and civil society 
experience lies in increasing the rate of schooling among girls. In 2003, the newly elected government 
launched a campaign called “Haydi Kızlar Okula!” (Off to School, Girls!) led by the ministry of 
education in cooperation with UNICEF.65 The campaign focused particularly on eastern provinces in 
Turkey and aimed at persuading parents to send their girls to school. Of the more than 270,000 
unregistered girls the campaign succeeded in getting more than 80 per cent of them to register and go 
regularly to school. The campaign also attracted the support of civil society. A number of non-
governmental organizations with long standing experience in the area of education became involved 
such as the Foundation for Contemporary Education (Çağdaş Eğitim Vakfı) that is a staunch supporter 
of women’s rights as well as secular form of life. Furthermore, a prominent Turkish daily Milliyet 
started its own campaign called “Baba beni okula gönder” (Daddy do send me to school) in 2005 to 
mobilise both public as well as financial support for the government’s efforts.66  
At first sight, this experience may not be directly relevant to the problems of Turkish immigrants. 
However, if one considers that through family reunification a considerable number of poorly educated 
brides join the Turkish immigrant community in Europe, the case may be different. Educational 
projects directed towards new brides and especially their children could surely make a contribution to 
the broader effort to ensure better incorporation of Turkish immigrants into mainstream life. In this 
context, the experience of the Turkish ministry of education as well as civil society in Turkey could be 
put into good use. Actually, a synergy could also be achieved if Turkish immigrants themselves would 
become involved in the campaign as donors or supporters. 
A third area has to do with the fact that Turkey faces its own “integration” problems resulting from 
massive internal migration that has taken place over the last decade from rural areas into urban 
centers. This has led to a growth in the population of major urban centers like Antalya, Ankara, 
Istanbul and Izmir, and migrants have had difficulties in adjusting to often very western ways of life in 
these urban centers. Honor killings and domestic violence against women are partly the expression of 
a failure to adjust or “integrate”. It is by a fascinating coincidence that the day the author of this paper 
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65 Details about the campaign can be reached at www.haydikizlarokula.org. 
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was due to make a presentation at a Salzburg Seminar on the idea of a “three way approach” to 
integration that an article by a prominent senior columnist, Taha Akyol, on internal migration and 
integration appeared in the Turkish daily Milliyet.67 In this article Akyol described the efforts and 
projects of a local government and civil society in the Istanbul township of Bağcılar to assist the 
integration of rural migrants into urban life. At least some of the “integration” problems did not seem 
very different than the ones that some Turkish immigrants encounter in Europe. There are at least two 
academic programs, the Migration Research Program at the Koc University and the Center for 
Migration Research at Bilgi University, that actively support research projects that look at 
“integration” related issues both in Turkey as well as in Europe. Quite a number of the papers 
presented at a major conference on migration and culture dealt with these issues.68 Similarly, there is 
also a growing interest in the influence of religion and religious factors on Turkish immigrant 
communities not to mention their integration. One of the papers presented at this conference actually 
was based on a project commissioned by Diyanet aiming at understanding the role of religion and 
influence of Muslim religious movements as well as the position that these movements take on the 
issue of “integration”.69 In other words, there is a growing academic and intellectual capital on 
“integration” that could easily be engaged should a “three way approach” to integration be adopted or 
advocated in the EU. 
Lastly, it is important to note that the attitude of the government in general has considerably 
evolved over the last couple of years on the issue of cooperation with host countries in respect to 
integration. The position of the prime minister and the former minister of foreign affairs has already 
been mentioned. However, it should be noted that they are not the only ones who want to see Turkey 
play a more positive role in this regard. Mehmet Aydin, a professor of theology and state minister 
responsible for religious affairs too has on numerous occasions highlighted the importance of Turkish 
immigrants integrating themselves into their host countries.70 It is not surprising that it should be 
during his term of office that Diyanet started a number of projects with the support of universities to 
train the imams to serve Turkish immigrant communities abroad in the realms of local languages and 
culture of the host country. This would have been unusual a couple of years ago. The Turkish Grand 
National Assembly has become interested in the problems of Turkish nationals living abroad too. The 
election in November 2002 of members of the Parliament with immigrant background or experience 
has played an important role in this. The Parliament constituted a commission in April 2003 to visit 
immigrant communities in Europe and investigate their problems. The Commission adopted an 
extensive report analysing a wide range of problems experienced by Turkish immigrants and 
submitted their recommendation in December 2003.71 
What form could the three way approach take? One obvious way would be to encourage contact 
between European non-governmental organizations and the Turkish ones. This should not be that 
                                                     
67 T. Akyol, “İç Göç ve Entegrasyon” Milliyet, 29 March 2007. The Salzburg Seminar was Session 440: Immigration and 
Inclusion: Rethinking National Identity” 27 March – 1 April 2007. 
68 İç/Dış/Göç ve Kültür” IV. Kültğür Araştırmaları Sempozyumu, 15-17 Eylül 2007, Işık University, Şile, İstanbul. 
69 Ibid, paper presented by N. Subaşı, “Avrupa’daki Türkler: Referans Arayışları, Söylem ve Tasavvurları”. 
70 The minister at an international conference on migration in Istanbul acknowledged that in the past, mistakes had been made 
by respective Turkish governments in respect to the integration of Turkish immigrants in Europe, and went on to 
elaborate a “four stage integration plan”. See M. Aydın, “Küreselleşme, Komşularımız ve Göçler” paper published in 8-
11 December 2005 International Migration Symposium Communiqué (Istanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi, 2006). In terms 
of the “three way approach” to integration, the minister shares an interesting anecdote in his paper about how, in a 
European country that remains unspecified, two members of parliament asked to meet him for dinner in the evening after 
a seminar, but later called and excused themselves from the planned dinner fearing that it might be on TV news, and that 
this might not be welcomed by their respective voters, (p. 202). 
71 See “Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlarımızın Sorunlarını Araştırılarak Alınması gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi 
Amacıyla Kurtulan meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu”, T.B.M.M., Session 22, Number 335, Legislative Year 2, 17 
December 2004. 
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difficult given the existence of numerous facilitating financial instruments. However, what is critical 
here is the Commission adopting the idea of a “three way approach” and actually encouraging non-
governmental organisations to develop projects reflecting the spirit of the approach. The Commission 
in its Migration and Development Communication had offered the possibility of “helping developing 
countries map their Diasporas and build links with them.” It could maybe do the opposite by 
identifying non-governmental organisations in sending countries that may have something to offer. In 
the case of accession countries such as Turkey and ENP countries such as Morocco, this should not be 
that difficult. It would literally just require crossing the “corridor” from DG Justice and Home Affairs 
to Enlargement, and study the progress reports that the Commission prepares for candidate and ENP 
countries each year that are often rich in information on these countries and their civil societies. 
However, the more difficult task would actually require changing “hearts and minds” especially 
among the officials of member states. The image that sending countries are part of the problem of 
“integration” will not be easy to change.72  
Additionally, the notion of “three way approach” to integration may appear to be too intrusive to 
some decision makers and analysts. Such an approach might provoke apprehensions over the fact that 
actors from sending countries might want to impact the decision making processes of the EU and 
member states from the back door. The most difficult of course will be to dismantle the dominant 
“Euro-centric” view of looking at some issues, and convince that sending countries may actually have 
something to contribute to resolving a problem of the EU. Yet, the Commission persevered for almost 
a whole decade to get EU member states to accept the “two way approach” to integration. It ought to 
be able to do the same with the “three way approach”. The Commission has already some of the tools 
to introduce the “three way approach” into the debate on “integration” in the EU without suggesting in 
any way that sending countries should become part of EU decision making processes. In its 
Communication on The Global Approach to Migration one year on, the Commission suggests the 
need “to establish Migration Support Teams (MISTs) composed of experts from EU Member States 
which could provide the necessary assistance to requesting African states”73 so as to help them deal 
with migratory flows. Why not consider similar MISTs on “integration”, composed of EU as well as 
third country experts, to assist EU member states that choose to seek help? The Commission goes on 
in the Communication, very rightly, to emphasize the importance of links between policy and 
research. It notes how, “Inspired by the academic network linking migration research institutes in 
Mediterranean countries (CARIM), the Commission will support initiatives stimulating the 
establishment of a pan-African network of migration 'observatories' and/or migration research 
institutes.”74 In this context, the Commission could perhaps encourage CARIM to set up a network of 
“integration observatories” composed of experts from the EU and some of the sending countries. This 
would enable both sides, the receiving and sending countries, to explore ways in which sending 
countries might be able to assist receiving countries in better integrating immigrants into main stream 
life. The Commission could also encourage member states to organise events in the context of the 
‘European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008’75 that would explore the idea of a “three way 
approach” to integration.  
Agencies of member states could also try to engage and benefit from the experiences of sending 
countries. Most EU member states have tremendous experience in assisting candidate countries 
through twinning projects in their efforts to harmonise their policies and practices with that of the EU 
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on a wide range of issues. Non-governmental organizations too have taken part in these projects. The 
author of this report has participated in numerous training seminars for the Turkish police, 
gendarmerie and judiciary concerning a wide range of issues from combating human smuggling and 
trafficking to the implementation of asylum law. Often the implementing partners of these training 
seminars were non-governmental organizations including the International Catholic Migration 
Commission (ICMC). Numerous middle and high rank officials have received certificates from ICMC 
with the name “Catholic” engraved on them. Would it not be impossible to envisage training programs 
in the other direction? Can’t one envisage that Turkish non-governmental organisations active on, for 
example, combating domestic violence against women, such as KAMER, run training seminars for the 
police or judges of EU member countries? An Austrian journalist participant at the above mentioned 
Salzburg Seminar mentioned how a number of Turkish immigrant women who were victim of 
domestic violence had approached the police in Vienna for help. The police had sent back these 
women to experience more violence and even death on the grounds that “in Turkish and Muslim 
culture domestic violence against women was normal and that they should submit themselves to their 
husbands.” Just as the Turkish police learns how to treat asylum seekers properly through the 
intermediary of EU and UNHCR officials in training seminars organised by ICMC, could it not be 
possible that English or German speaking Turkish women officials affiliated for instance to the 
General Directorate on the Status of Women in Turkey and KAMER run similar training programs for 
the Austrian police. Similar training programs could be envisaged for the judiciary of some member 
countries who believe that the Shari’a Law should be applied to Muslim immigrant women in Europe 
and are not aware that women’s rights are defined by secular law in Turkey.  
A list of possible ways of cooperation in support of a “three way approach” to integration could be 
expanded ad infinitum. However, the critical point here is to recognise that in a globalising world 
characterised by transnationalism it would be difficult to address the “integration” problems of 
immigrant communities, especially the Muslim ones, without adopting a “three way approach” where 
possible. Turkey has been used here as an example, however, the same observations could possibly 
made for Morocco too. Even if not all sending countries might be in a position or for that matter 
willing to engage themselves as players in a “three way approach” to integration, the European 
Commission as well as other stakeholders with an interest in a better incorporation of immigrants into 
mainstream life of host countries ought to consider exploring the idea. It would fit well with the 
aspiration of developing a “global and comprehensive approach to migration” of the EU. 
Conclusion: 
The “control and security” as well as the “burden shifting” nature of the EU evolving common 
migration policy has been highlighted by a plethora of writings.76 A survey of the EU documents 
covered in this paper reinforces this in spite of the frequent employment of the term “partnerships” 
with sending and transit countries. The efforts of the EU to develop a “global and comprehensive 
approach to migration” are relegating third countries to “managing migration flows” by performing 
“control” duties in return for basic technical assistance and a vague promise of visa facilitation. The 
relationship would seem a little more balanced in the case of “migration and development” if it were 
not for the thinly veiled EU objective of encouraging development to stop “unwanted migration” from 
sending countries. In the case of “integration” of immigrants, sending countries are simply not in the 
picture, and no notion of “partnership” is envisaged.  
Adopting and implementing the idea of “three way approach” to integration may contribute to a 
genuine dialogue between the EU and at least part of the migrant sending world. A genuine dialogue 
                                                     
76 See for example Geddes (2000 and 2007); S. Lavenex and E. Uçarer (eds.) Migration and the Externalities of European 
Integration (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002); S. Lavanex, ‘Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European 
Immigration Control’, West European Politics Vol. 29, No. 2 (2006). 
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need not be understood to mean any sort of interference on the part of the sending countries in the EU 
decision making processes on “integration” policies. It would mean no more than acknowledging that 
sending countries may have the social capital, the experience and the interest to contribute to EU 
efforts to develop better “integration” policies. Members of academia and civil society as well as 
government experts from sending countries, where appropriate, could be engaged by the European 
Commission and willing member state governments and/or their civil society to share their 
experiences and ideas. This would also lead to the recognition that both sides may have something to 
contribute and actually help each other in concrete and meaningful ways. This would be a much more 
promising relationship and more genuine “partnership” than the existing one so far. This would also be 
closer to the idea of “dialogue” that is omnipresent in practically all of the EU documents studied for 
this paper.  
Clearly not all sending countries may be in a position to participate in a “three way approach” to 
integration. However, all the countries mentioned in the Communication on The Global Approach to 
Migration one Year on more or less would have the capacity to do so. In any event two of them, 
Bulgaria and Romania on the list, have become EU members in the meantime. Turkey is on the other 
hand involved in the accession process for membership of the EU. The case of Turkey is also 
particular because of the large Turkish immigrant community but also because it is a Muslim country 
that has been significantly transformed partly thanks to the EU’s engagement of Turkey. Part of the 
Turkish buoyant civil society today addresses social problems that very much resemble the ones faced 
by Turkish immigrants who fail to integrate in Europe. In addition, the government’s attitude toward 
Turkish immigrant communities has been transformed, and also governmental institutions have 
become much more accustomed to cooperating with the international community. This ought to make 
Turkey a useful partner for the EU in formulating successful “integration” policies.  
One additional and important factor is that a good proportion of the “integration” problem in 
Europe concerns Muslim immigrants. The arising danger in Europe is that the issue of “integration” is 
being deeply framed by growing Islamophobia. This is clearly exacerbating relations between the 
Muslim world and Europe. Furthermore, there is a lot of talk about “dialogue” that often remains 
theoretical and abstract. Introducing the idea of a “three way approach” as a concrete manifestation of 
“dialogue” involving “partners” could constitute a concrete step in the direction of confidence building 
not only between the EU and Turkey but also between Europe and the Muslim world. It would go well 
with the EU’s efforts to add an “external dimension” to its common migration policies. In this context, 
the Report of the High Level Group of the Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) is a particularly important 
document that does address the “challenge of migration” and acknowledges the problem of 
“integration” of Muslim immigrants especially in Europe. The Report also takes into account the 
importance of dialogue in addressing these problems. The fact that the AoC is co-sponsored by the 
prime ministers of Spain and Turkey and that its secretariat is led by a former president of Portugal 
may bode well in terms of developing the idea of a “three way approach” to integration. 
In any event, a lot will depend on the European Commission. The Commission has more than a 
two-decade experience in trying to raise the issue of the “integration” of TCNs. This experience has 
not been an easy one, and the Commission has had to take a few dents along the way. Member states 
have been notoriously resistant to change and to new ideas in the area of migration. Nevertheless, the 
EU’s “common” migration policy has come a long way. At least today, the Commission has a much 
clearer role in respect to “integration” and has gotten member states to accept the wisdom of the “two-
way approach”. As Geddes points out the Commission has an important agenda setting role to play in 
the area of migration issues.77  
The idea of a “two way approach” to integration took almost a whole decade to percolate through 
the corridors of EU and member states policy thinking and making before it became part of the CBPs. 
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Should the Commission and the EP choose to adopt the idea of the “three way approach” hopefully on 
this occasion, a whole decade may not be needed. The documents and instruments concerning 
“integration” that the Commission has developed have more than enough room to incorporate this 
approach. The 'European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008' may well be the best occasion to start a 
debate and discussion on the topic.  
Kemal Kirişci 
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COM(2007) 248 final, Brussels, 16 May 2007. 
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Parliament: The Global Approach to Migration one Year on: Towards a Comprehensive European 
Migration Policy. COM(2006) 735 final, Brussels, 30 November 2006. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission: on Policy Priorities in the Fight 
against Illegal Immigration of Third-Country Nationals. COM(2006) 402 final, Brussels, 19 July 
2006. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: the 
Second Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM (2006) 892 final, Brussels, 30 June 2006. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission: on Policy Plan on Legal Migration 
COM (2005), 669 Final, Brussels, 21 December 2005. 
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September 2005. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
A Common Agenda for Integration - Framework for the Integration of Third-Country 
Nationals in the European Union. COM (2005) 389 final, Brussels, 1 September 2005. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
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European Renewal. COM (2005) 184 final, Brussels, 10 May 2005. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The 
First Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM (2004) 508 final, Brussels, 16 July 2004. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: On 
Immigration, Integration and Employment. COM (2003) 336 final, Brussels, 3 June 2003. 
“Three Way Approach” to Meeting the Challenges of Migrant Incorporation in the European Union: Reflections from a Turkish Perspective 
CARIM-RR No. 2008/03 © 2008 EUI-RSCAS 25 
European Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission): 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Wider Europe— Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and 
Southern Neighbours. COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy 
Strategy Paper. COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission: A Strong European Neighbourhood 
Policy. COM(2007) 774 final, Brussels, 5 December 2007 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy. COM(2006)726 final, Brussels, 4 
December 2006. 
Immigration and integration (EU legislative bodies): 
Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 12 and 13 June 2007, Conclusions of the 
Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States On the Strengthening of 
Integration Policies in the European Union by Promoting Unity in Diversity.  
Council Decision establishing the European Fund for the Integration of third country nationals for the 
period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General Programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration 
Flows’. Brussels, 18 April 2007, 16923/06. 
European Parliament resolution on Strategies and Means for the Integration of Immigrants in the 
European Union (2006/2056(INI)), adopted 6 July 2006. 
Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of 19 November 2004, Common Basic Principles on 
Integration, Council Document 14615/04. 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, 15 and 16 October 1999. 
Other documents: 
Beyond the Common Basic Principles on Integration: The next steps, prepared by the European Policy 
Center and King Baudouin Foundation Multicultural Europe Team* Issue Paper 27 (Revised) 15 April 
2005  
Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action (Report of the Global 
Commission on International Migration, October 2005). 
